We introduce a new dynamic framework to analyze two-sided matching interactions that occur repeatedly over time such as teacher-student matching or hospital-intern markets in Britain. We propose a new dynamic concept of credible group stability and show that implementing a men-optimal stable matching in each period is credibly group-stable. Similarly for women. A credibly group-stable dynamic matching is immune to any defensible group deviations with an appropriate definition of defensibility. Moreover, a sufficient condition for Pareto efficiency is given for repeated markets.
Introduction
Much of economic life involves two-sided matching which often spans the long-term. Examples include music lessons, teacher-student interactions, long-term business relationships between firms, and hospital-intern markets.
Consider music lessons organized by an institution such as City Music Center of Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, PA. The Center's teachers have preferences over students they would like to teach, and students have preferences over teachers. Tuition does not play a decisive role in matching, because the tuition is not differentiated by teachers or students. Thus, this can be seen as a two-sided matching interaction. To better play the piano, students have to spend many years taking lessons, and thus to be involved in long-term relationship. Hence, this is a dynamic two-sided matching market.
Another example is British entry-level medical labor markets. These markets involve graduating medical students and teaching hospitals. Students seek residency positions for both medical and surgical programs of hospitals, and have one for the first six months and another for the next six months. Teaching hospitals fill positions in both two periods. Thus, this is a dynamic two-sided matching market with two periods although this market has been modeled as a "static" market (See Roth (1991) ).
Until now, although static relationships have been extensively studied in matching markets (cf. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) and Roth (2002) ), there has been almost no attempt to analyze dynamic relationships. 1 We introduce a new framework to analyze two-sided dynamic interactions. In our model, there are two finite disjoint sets of agents. Time is discrete with finite horizon. Each agent is supposed either to be matched with those in the opposite set or to be unmatched in each period. Agents do not have to commit themselves to their prior partners and can freely change partners at any period. Each agent has a time-separable utility function over those in the opposite set and being unmatched in each period. The preferences may vary across periods. Damiano and Lam (2005) consider only the case where the preferences are constant across time with a discount factor, i.e., repeated matching markets. This setting is unrealistic. In the music lessons discussed, as students' skills improve, they prefer teachers with different skills. Violin teachers may not value students who did not learn the piano in the past. That is, their current preferences may depend on the past matchings. Moreover, Damiano and Lam (2005) assume that agents choose an outcome path, or a sequence of matchings but not a contingent plan based on realized matchings. This is restrictive, because agents can change prior partners at any time. In this paper, we consider a contingent plan called a "dynamic matching." The problem in dynamic matching markets is to analyze what kinds of matchings might arise in each period under a dynamic matching.
In static settings, it is shown that a property of static matching known as "stability" is central to determining whether such matchings will be sustainable in real-life applications (cf. Roth (1984 Roth ( , 1991 Roth ( , 2002 ). Stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962) requires that (1) no individual would rather stay unmatched than continue with her current partner, and (2) no pair of individuals such as a teacher and a student or a hospital and an intern, would prefer each other to their current partners. Two stable matchings have attracted much attention in real-life applications as well as theory: "hospital-optimal" and "intern-optimal stable" matchings in the case of hospital-intern markets, where the former (the latter) is the best among stable matchings for hospitals (interns). For example, several regional markets in the aforementioned British matching markets use "hospital or intern optimal (statically) stable" mechanisms in their centralized matching process, although the markets are dynamic. As Roth (p430, 1991) noted, this static stable mechanism may produce a "higher-order" instability regarding dynamic aspects. In fact, as we will show in Examples 2 and 3, such matchings need not create "dynamically stable" or even "Pareto efficient" outcomes. However, these centralized clearinghouses have been successfully used in the last forty years in Britain. This creates a puzzle: Why is implementing a hospital-optimal or internoptimal (statically) stable matching so robust in the British markets? This paper provides theoretical support for the robustness.
In this paper, we are concerned with one-to-one matching markets, conventionally called marriage markets (Gale and Shapley, 1962) . In a marriage market there are, so called, "men" and "women," each of whom can be matched with at most one partner of the opposite sex. Although we do not deal with many-to-one matching markets such as hospital-intern and teacher-student markets, we can apply conceptual tools and insights developed in this paper. The aforementioned British markets have been modeled as many-to-two matching markets (Roth, 1991) . The hospital or intern-optimal stable matchings correspond to "men or women-optimal stable" matchings in marriage markets.
Traditionally, the cooperative solution concept "core" has been used in analyzing such markets. We begin by pointing out that coalitional deviations considered in the definition of core are restrictive in dynamic matching markets. Taking into account more general deviations, we propose a definition of (dynamic) group stability that is stronger than core. An outcome path, or a sequence of matchings, is in the core if no deviating coalition, by choosing another outcome path only among themselves, can make each agent strictly better off. In other words, after the deviation in the first period, agents in a deviating coalition must be matched with each other from the beginning to the end, and are not allowed to be matched with agents outside the coalition. This deviation is restrictive.
We propose another concept that allows for more general deviations than those permitted a la core, because in the dynamic relationships we explore, agents are free to sequentially form new partnerships whenever they want. We define "(dynamic) group stability" by requiring a dynamic matching to be immune against group deviations that do not force agents to be matched within the group during all periods. 2 However, a group stable dynamic matching may not always exist (cf. Examples 2 and 3). This means that a dynamic matching consisting only of men-optimal stable matchings may not be group stable in a dynamic setting. On the other hand, introducing a new dynamic stability concept called "credible group stability," such a dynamic matching is justified. That is, we show in Theorem 2 that any dynamic matching that assigns a men-optimal stable matching in each period is "credibly group-stable." Similarly for women-optimal stable matchings. The hospital-optimal (or intern-optimal) stable mechanism in the aforementioned British markets turns out to be credibly group-stable if we translate it to marriage markets.
Closely looking at possible group deviations from a dynamic matching, we see that some of them may not be defensible in a certain way. In a static market, even if a group benefits by reorganizing their match, some members may have an incentive to deviate further by matching with another agent inside or "outside" the group. In this case, we say that such group devia-tions are not "defensible." A "credibly group-stable" matching is immune to defensible group deviations. On the other hand, in a dynamic market, we require a defensible group deviation to be "sequentially rational" in that the future dynamic matching is also defensible (defined recursively). Moreover, we require that it should be immune to further sequentially rational deviations in which a member has no opportunity to be matched with agents inside or outside the group. A "credibly group-stable" dynamic matching is immune to such defensible group deviations.
In the aforementioned British markets, our result on credible group stability adds a significant policy implication to the work of Konishi andÜnver (2006) . They show in a static many-to-two market that the set of pairwise stable matchings is equivalent to the set of "credibly group-stable" matchings (their notion of credibility is different from ours) under reasonable preference domains. That is, a stable matching other than hospital-optimal (or student-optimal) ones is supported by their credible group-stability but may not be so by ours (cf. Example 5).
The second question we explore is whether a credibly group-stable dynamic matching that involves a men-optimal (or women-optimal) stable matching in each period is Pareto efficient. We show that this may not be true in Example 2. We show in Theorem 3 that under a regularity condition, such dynamic matchings will also be Pareto efficient.
Related literature
In a closely related paper, Damiano and Lam (2005) consider repeated marriage models. They propose variants of "core" as a solution concept by taking into account dynamic commitment and credible deviations. Their model is on "repeated" markets in which preferences are "time independent." Our model explores "dynamic" relationships that may have changes of preferences as in the real-life markets. That is, the dynamic markets are "time dependent." Therefore, our model incorporates theirs. In the framework of random matching models of money (Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989 As Roth (1991) models a dynamic market as a static many-to-two matching market, many-to-many matching markets are an alternative of dynamic matching markets with strong preference restrictions. For example, see Sotomayor (1999), Echenique and Oviedo (2006) and Konishi andÜnver (2006) for many-to-many matching markets.
In a static setting, the matching literature uses group stability instead of core because the deviation considered in the definition of core is not realistic. In other words, the non-characteristic function approach is used to define group stability. For example, see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for many-toone matching markets and the papers listed in the previous paragraph for many-to-many matching markets. This approach is also used in network games (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) .
The credibility problem for deviating coalitions has been studied in both static and dynamic settings. In a static setting, Bernheim et al. (1987) propose a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium for a normal form game in which deviating coalitions should themselves be stable against further deviations within the coalitions. Ray (1989) defines the cooperative analogue of this approach called modified core. In the same spirit on coalitional deviations, Bernheim et al. (1987) define the perfect coalition-proofness for extensive form games. Damiano and Lam (2005) define the cooperative analogue of self-sustaining stability for repeated matching markets. Turning to other approaches in a static setting, Zhou (1994) introduces the bargaining set for games in coalitional form. Klijn and Massó (2003) apply his definition to the marriage model. Moreover, they introduce weak stability and investigate the relation with the bargaining set. These two concepts allow members of a deviating coalition to deviate further with agents outside the coalition. We follow the same approach. In fact, weak stability coincides with credible pairwise stability in a static setting that is a special case of our credible group stability in the dynamic setting.
The Model

Preliminaries: static marriage markets
We define a static (marriage) market as a triple (M, W, {u i } i∈I ). By a static market, we always mean a static marriage market. The set I := M ∪W of agents is divided into two finite disjoint subsets M and W . M is the set of men and W is the set of women. Note that |M | = |W | in general. Generic agents are denoted by i ∈ I, while generic men and women are denoted by m and w, respectively. Man m's utility function is u m : W ∪ {m} → R, and woman w's utility function is u w : M ∪ {w} → R. Woman w is acceptable to man m if u m (w) ≥ u m (m), and similarly for m. An agent is said to have strict preferences if he or she is not indifferent between any two choices. We assume throughout the paper that all agents have strict preferences. In this market, each agent is either matched with another agent on the opposite sex or unmatched. An outcome is a matching defined by a bijection µ : M ∪ W → M ∪ W such that for each i ∈ I, (µ • µ)(i) = i, and if µ(m) = m then µ(m) ∈ W , and if µ(w) = w then µ(w) ∈ M . Fixing M and W , let M be the set of all matchings. If µ(i) = i, agent i is said to be unmatched, and denote this pair by (i, i). If µ(m) = w, equivalently µ(w) = m, then w is said to be matched with m, and denote this pair by (m, w). For notational simplicity, we often use u i (µ) instead of u i (µ(i)). A matching µ is individually rational if each agent is acceptable to his or her partner, i.e., u i (µ) ≥ u i (i) for each agent i in I. Given a matching µ, a pair (m, w) blocks µ if they are not matched with each other in µ but prefer each other to their matched partners in µ, i.e. u m (w) > u m (µ) and u w (m) > u w (µ).
Definition 1 (Gale and Shapley (1962)). A matching µ is called
The adverb "statically" is omitted if there is no confusion. Moreover, Gale and Shapley (1962) prove the existence of stable matchings:
Theorem 1 (Existence: Gale and Shapley (1962)). A stable matching exists for each static market. In particular, when all agents have strict preferences, there always exist a men-optimal stable matching (that every man likes at least as well as any other stable matching) and a women-optimal stable matching.
Dynamic marriage markets
We consider a dynamic (marriage) market under finite horizon. By a dynamic market, we always mean a dynamic marriage market. In this market, there are fixed sets of M and W , where M and W are disjoint and finite. Each agent is supposed either to be matched with at most one agent of the opposite sex or to be unmatched at each period t = 0, · · · , T . Agents do not have to commit themselves to their prior partners and can freely change partners at any period. Each agent has a time-separable utility function over those in the other sex and being unmatched. Man m's utility function at period t is u t m : W ∪ {w} → R, while woman w's utility function is u t w : M ∪ {w} → R. We assume throughout the paper that all agents have strict preferences in each period. An outcome path is a sequence of matchings, µ := {µ t } T t=0 . Given an outcome path µ = {µ t } T t=0 , agent i's utility function is given by
where for notational simplicity we use u t i (µ t ) instead of u t i (µ t (i)). Each agent knows his or her utility functions and the others'. The above structure is common knowledge. Thus, a dynamic market is a triple Γ T := (M, W, {u t i } i∈I,t=0,··· ,T ). Looking at period t, (M, W, {u t i } i∈I ) is a static market, called a period t (marriage) market. If we do not need to specify the period, we call it a constituent (marriage) market. A dynamic market is called a repeated (marriage) market if for each i ∈ I there is a discount factor δ i ∈ (0, 1] and a utility function u i such that u t i = δ t u i .
Dynamic Group Stability
Core and dynamic group stability
In this dynamic market, the problem is which matchings might arise in each period. In other words, which outcome paths 3 will result from interaction among agents? The core 4 gives an answer:
Definition 2. An outcome path µ = {µ t } T t=0 is in the core if no coalition blocks it, i.e. there is no coalition A and outcome pathμ = {μ t } T t=0 such that (a)μ t (i) ∈ A, for each t = 0, 1, · · · , T and for each i in A, and
where
We use this notation throughout the paper. We will point out that the core is unrealistic by looking at what kinds of deviations are considered in the core, and then consider a newly defined deviation to define group stability. 5 Let's examine how the core is defined. The condition (a) in Definition 2 requires that after a coalition deviates from µ, all agents in the coalition must be matched only among themselves "from the beginning to the end". This condition is restrictive. We can think the situations in which agents are matched among themselves for only "several" periods, while still being matched with the old partners at other dates. Example 1. Consider a two-period dynamic market with M = {m 1 , m 2 } and W = {w 1 }. The constituent markets are illustrated in Figure 1 , while the total utilities depending on the outcome paths are shown in Figure 2 . In Figure 1 , the nodes represent the agents, the lines (or no line) represent matches (or no match). The number attached to a node stands for the utility from the match. In this market, there are two outcome paths in the core: µ 1 := (µ a , µ b ) and µ 2 := (µ b , µ b ) the latter of which is indicated by circles in Figure 2 . Consider why µ 2 is in the core. We can see that it is individually rational and that no grand coalition blocks it. Consider the coalition {m 1 , w 1 }. The outcome paths this coalition can make are (µ a , µ a ), (µ a , µ c ), and (µ c , µ a ). Agents (m 1 , w 1 ) obtain (1, 1), (2, 2) and (−1, −1) instead of (0, 3), respectively. However, given that µ b is chosen at the second period, the pair (m 1 , w 1 ) has an incentive to be matched (i.e. the resulting matching is µ a ) in the first period and µ b in the second-period. Then, (m 1 , w 1 ) gets (2, 4) instead of (0, 3). Instead of thinking that a coalition has to be matched only among themselves from beginning to end, it may be more appropriate to think that deviators are matched among themselves in only several periods, while still being matched with the old partners in other periods. We consider these kinds of deviations in the definition of a new solution concept of dynamic group stability.
Once we allow this kind of deviation, the object that agents are concerned with becomes a contingent plan based on histories of matchings instead of an outcome path. The contingent plan is called a dynamic matching. 6 Now we are away from a characteristic function approach to define solution concepts, 7 so we use a "group" instead of a coalition. Our goal is to define dynamic group stability which is "stable" against "group deviations" described above. We need to introduce several notions: A history at period t, t ≥ 1, is h t := (µ 0 , µ 1 , · · · , µ t−1 ) ∈ M t , and h 0 := ∅ is the history at the start of the market. Let H t be the set of all histories at period t, i.e. 
A dynamic matching φ induces a unique outcome path µ(φ) := {µ t (φ)} T t=0 recursively as follows:
We are interested in whether a given dynamic matching is "stable" (in some sense) against group deviations. To this end, when some group deviates at some history from a given dynamic matching, we must specify how the outsiders respond to the group deviation. This is because the payoffs that agents within the deviating group obtain depend on the outsiders' behavior through the change in histories. In this regard, we make a simple assumption that the outsiders who were matched with agents in the group before the deviation become unmatched, and the other outsiders are matched with the same partners as before. Thus, we start to describe how a matching is changed in response to a group deviation. In a static market, the adjective "static" is omitted when there is no confusion. The condition (a) requires that deviating agents in A should be matched with each other. The condition (b) requires that the agents outside the group A should be matched at µ, while the condition (c) requires that any agent who was a partner of an agent outside A should be unmatched under µ. See the example illustrated in Figure 3 , where all of group deviations from µ 0 by the group A := {m 1 , w 1 , w 2 } are illustrated. Consider a matching µ 1 . Condition (a) is satisfied, since m 1 is matched with w 1 and w 2 is unmatched; condition (b) is satisfied, since m 3 and w 3 remain matched; condition (c) is satisfied, since m 2 who was matched with w 2 in A becomes unmatched.
Definition 5. Given a dynamic matching φ, a (dynamic) group deviation from φ is a pair (A,φ) of group A and dynamic matchingφ such that there is a (possibly empty) subset H of H, for each h in H , a pair (A,φ(h)) is a static group deviation from a matching φ(h), and for each h in H \ H , φ(h) = φ(h).
In the dynamic group deviation (A,φ) from φ, at histories h in H agents in A reorganize their match within A and the others remain matched at bae, Temzelides and Wright (2003) . In addition, this notion is different from enforcement used to define a bargaining set in Klijn and Massó (2003) .
φ(h). At the rest of histories all of agents are matched at φ(h) and possibly matched with agents outside A, which makes our dynamic group deviation different from deviations permitted a la core. The adjective "dynamic" is omitted when there is no confusion. For example, consider a dynamic matching φ specifying µ 0 at each history in the repeated market of the constituent market depicted in Figure 3 . One possible group deviationφ by {m 1 , w 1 , w 2 }φ
In Definition 4 and 5, the term "group" described above as a group deviation is replaced by an individual, pair, and pairwise if the group A is A = {i} for some i in I, A = {m, w}, and either an individual or a pair, respectively. A group A is said to block the dynamic matching φ (viaφ) if (A,φ) is a dynamic group deviation from φ and U A (φ) > U A (φ). Now we are ready to introduce our newly defined concept 9 : Definition 6. A dynamic matching φ is (dynamically) group-stable if no group blocks it, i.e. there is no group deviation (A,φ) from the dynamic matching φ such that U A (φ) > U A (φ), that is, each agent in A is strictly better off. Moreover, if we consider only pairwise deviations, it is called (dynamically) pairwise-stable. When a dynamic market boils down to a static market (i.e. T = 0), a matching µ is called (statically) groupstable if it is dynamically group-stable.
Note that for T = 0, any dynamic matching is expressed by a matching. For the equivalence of (a) and (b), see Theorem 3.3 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). To show the equivalence of (b) and (c), observe that in both concepts only a deviating group matters but not the outsiders in a static setting. Proposition 1. If a dynamic matching is group stable, then its outcome path is in the core. The converse is not true.
The proof of the first part is in the appendix. For the latter part, see Examples 2 and 3 in the next subsection. In addition, we may not have a group stable dynamic matching, as given in the next subsection. However, if we restrict our attention to repeated markets, Proposition 2 can guarantee the existence of dynamic pairwise stable dynamic matching.
Proposition 2 (Existence of a pairwise stable dynamic matching in "repeated" markets). There exists a pairwise stable dynamic matching for each repeated market.
A sketch of the proof is in the appendix. There are three remarks. First, we do not need strict preferences for this proposition. Second, if it is not pairwise but group stable, there may be no group stable dynamic matching (cf. Example 2 in the next subsection). Finally, if it is not a repeated market but a "dynamic" market, there may be no pairwise stable dynamic matching (cf. Example 3 in the next subsection.).
Before examining examples, it is useful to characterize dynamic group stability. Consider a dynamic market Γ T = (M, W, {u t i } i∈I,t=0,··· ,T ). At history h t ∈ H, the sub-dynamic (marriage) market is a dynamic market Γ T (h t ) := (M, W, {u τ i } i∈I,τ =t,··· ,T ). Given a dynamic matching φ for the original market Γ T , define a continuation dynamic matching to be a function φ| h t : M T −t+1 → M given by φ| h t (h τ ) = φ(h t h τ ) for each h τ ∈ M T −t+1 . Now we are ready to state: Lemma 2 (Partial characterization of group stable dynamic matchings). Consider a dynamic market Γ T . If there is a group stable dynamic matching φ, then for each history h on the outcome path, the continuation dynamic matching φ| h is group stable in the sub-dynamic market Γ T (h).
The proof is straightforward and we omit it. This lemma says that a group stable dynamic matching is sequentially rational on the outcome path.
Examples
Example 1 (Continued). The outcome path µ 2 := (µ b , µ b ) was in the core, and is supported by the following group stable dynamic matching:
However, the dynamic matching specifying µ b at each history cannot be group stable, as we discussed before. Thus, we need to consider historydependent contingent plans.
Example 2. (The core is nonempty but there is no group stable dynamic matching) Consider a twice repeated market with no discounting whose constituent market 10 is depicted in Figure 4 . Here M = {m 1 , m 2 } and W = {w 1 , w 2 }. There are seven possible matchings, but only three of them are depicted. Note that the matching µ M is man-preferred but unstable, µ W is woman-preferred but unstable, and µ U is uniquely stable. First, it can be verified that outcome paths (µ M , µ W ) and (µ W , µ M ) are in the core. Next, we show that there is no group stable dynamic matchng. Suppose for a contradiction that there is a group stable dynamic matching φ. Then, Lemma 2 says that the matching at the second period in the outcome path is µ U , since µ U is a unique stable matching in the constituent market. Thus, if φ(∅) = µ U , then φ(µ) = µ U . Then, there exists at least one agent i who gets his or her payoff of −1. This agent always has an option of being unmatched in both periods, which provides a return of 0. Thus, agent i blocks φ. Thus, the only possibility is φ(∅) = µ U . Then, φ(µ U ) = µ U by Lemma 2. Now each agent gets the payoff of 0. However, the group I ≡ {m 1 , m 2 , w 1 , w 2 } can make a deviation φ such that φ (∅) = µ M and φ (µ M ) = µ W . Then, each agent's payoff is 4. So, the group I blocks φ via φ . In any case, some group blocks φ. This is a contradiction.
Example 3. (The core is nonempty but there is no pairwise stable dynamic matching.) Consider a two-period dynamic market 11 depicted in Figure 5 . Here there are man m and woman w. Unlike the previous example, preferences vary across periods. In each period, the matching µ U (unmatched) is stable, while the matching µ T (together) is not stable. It can be verified that the outcome path (µ T , µ T ) is in the core. Similarly to the previous example, we can show by contradiction that there is no pairwise stable dynamic matching. 4 Credible Group Stability
Definition
As we discussed in the Introduction, we are interested in what kind of stability concept supports a time-dependent dynamic matching assigning a menoptimal (or women-optimal) stable matching in each period. We develop such a concept of credible group stability.
Example 3 (Continued). Consider why in Example 3 there is no pairwise stable dynamic matching. A candidate for "stability" would be a φ specifying a stable matching µ U at each history. However, the group {m, w} blocks it via the matching that span periods, that is, the one which specifies µ T at each history. However, this deviation is not defensible in the sense that after the deviation, the woman wants to deviate in the second period. We require a defensible group deviation (A,φ) from φ to have defensible continuation dynamic matchings. With this condition, the above deviation is no longer defensible. That is, a deviation by {m, w} has the further deviation by w, i.e. in a group deviation a member of the group has the further deviation within the group. Example 4. To clarify the notion of defensibility, consider a two-period dynamic market with M = {m 1 , m 2 }, W = {w 1 , w 2 }. Constituent markets are illustrated in Figure 6 , where the utilities of being unmatched for all agents are 0 in both markets. The payoffs depending on outcome paths are calculated in Figure 7 . Note that the figures do not include all possible matchings, but only three of them. Consider the dynamic matching specifying the stable matching µ M in both periods (which is circled by solid lines in Figure 7 ). This is not pairwise stable, because the pair (m 1 , w 2 ) blocks it via the dynamic matching φ specifying µ 12 at each history (which is circled by dashed lines in the Figure) . Closely looking at the deviation in the second period, we observe that it may not be defensible. The reason is that m 1 would want to be matched with w 1 again and w 1 would agree on this. In summary, the deviation by {m 1 , w 2 } in the second period has the further deviation by the member m 1 in the group who is matched with w 1 outside the group. We say that such a deviation is not defensible. We consider only defensible deviations in the solution concept which we define next.
First, we define a solution concept of credible group stability for a static market which is an extension of weak stability introduced by Klijn and Massó (2003) . 12 Precisely speaking, weak stability coincides with credible pairwise stability.
Definition 7. In a static market, let a matching µ be given. In a defensible group deviation (A,μ), there is no further profitable pairwise deviation in which at least one agent belongs to A. A credibly groupstable matching is immune to defensible group deviations.
As mentioned earlier, the idea is different from that of Bernheim et al., (1987) and Ray (1989) . Consider a group deviation (A, µ ) from µ. In their definitions, the condition A ∩ B = ∅ is replaced by B ⊂ A. In words, a deviating group cares about further group deviations "within" the group A. On the other hand, in our definition, the deviating group cares about the possibility that some member within the group may deviate with some member "outside" the group as well as within it.
Lemma 3. In a static market, (a) a stable matching is credibly group-stable, (b) a credibly group-stable matching may not be stable, and (c) a credibly pairwise-stable matching may not be credibly group-stable.
The first statement is obvious, since a stable matching is group stable by Lemma 1. For the rest, examples are given in the appendix. Hence, credible group stability is strictly stronger than credible pairwise stability, and strictly weaker than stability.
The following lemma and corollary are the key in proving the existence of credible group stability for dynamic markets (which will be defined soon).
Lemma 4. In a static market, for each stable matching µ, if a group deviation (A,μ) from µ is defensible, thenμ is stable.
The proof is in the appendix. The following corollary follows from this lemma and Theorem 1. Corollary 1. In a static market, for each defensible group deviation (A,μ) from a men-optimal stable matching µ M , for each m in M ∩ A, u m (µ M ) ≥ u m (μ). Similarly for a women-optimal stable matching.
Turning to dynamic markets, we define defensibility recursively on periods, and use it to introduce our newly defined concept of credible group stability. The condition (1) is consistent with defensibility for a static market. The condition (2) generalizes this definition in a recursively: First, we restrict possible dynamic group-deviations to sequentially rational ones in that their continuation dynamic matchings are also defensible (defined recursively). In addition, we require a defensible group deviation to be sequentially rational and to have no further profitable and sequentially rational pairwisedeviation. Now, we are ready to define: Definition 9. A dynamic matching φ is credibly group-stable if there is no defensible group deviation (A,φ) from φ such that U A (φ) > U A (φ).
In words, credibly group-stable dynamic matching is immune against defensible group deviations.
Existence
Theorem 2 (Existence). In a dynamic market, a time-dependent dynamic matching assigning a men-optimal stable matching in each period is credibly group-stable. Similarly for a women-optimal stable matching.
Proof. Note that the existence of such a time-dependent dynamic matching follows from Theorem 1.
Pick a men-optimal stable matching µ t in each period t market. Let φ be a time-dependent dynamic matching with φ(h t ) = µ t for each h t in H. Fix a defensible group deviation (A,φ) from φ. Denote the outcome path of φ by (μ 0 ,μ 1 , · · · ,μ T ). We need to show that U i (φ) ≥ U i (φ) for some i in A.
First, consider the case where some man m is in A. We prove by induction on T that U m (φ) ≥ U m (φ). For T = 0, the claim follows from Corollary 1. Suppose that the claim is true for less than T where T ≥ 1. Since φ is time-dependent, (A,φ|μ0) is a group deviation from φ| µ 0 , and is defensible, as (A,φ) is sequentially rational. Thus, by our induction hypothesis, U m (φ| µ 0 ) ≥ U m (φ|μ0). Now, it is sufficient to show that the group deviation (A,μ 0 ) from µ 0 is defensible in the period 0 market, since if this is true, it follows from Corollary 1 that
Suppose for a contradiction that (A,μ 0 ) is not defensible. Then, there exists a pairwise deviation (B,μ) fromμ 0 with A ∩ B = ∅ such that u 0 B (μ) > u 0 B (μ 0 ). Consider the following dynamic matchingφ:
Note thatφ|μ =φ|μ0 and (B,φ) is sequentially rational. Then,
This contradicts the assumption that (A,φ) is defensible.
Next, consider the case where A consists only of women. Fix w ∈ A. Although we cannot use Corollary 1, we use the fact that in a static market, for each stable matching µ and for each group deviation (A,μ) from µ, u w (µ) ≥ u w (μ), where A ⊂ W . This follows from the observation that atμ woman w in A is either unmatched or matched with an agent µ(w), and µ is individually rational. Using this fact, we can show in a similar way to the previous case that U w (φ) ≥ U w (φ) for each w in A.
Therefore, we proved that for each defensible group deviation (A,φ) from φ, U i (φ) ≥ U i (φ) for some i in A.
One question arises: Is a dynamic matching consisting of stable matchings other than only men-optimal (women-optimal) stable matchings always credibly group-stable? The following example gives negative answers.
Example 5. Consider a two-period dynamic market whose constituent markets are depicted in Figure 8 , where utility values of being unmatched are 0, and those unspecified are negative. µ M and µ W indicate men-optimal and women-optimal stable matchings, respectively. In addition, µ S denotes another stable matching in the figure.
Figure 8: Constituent markets in Example 5
Case 1: A time-dependent dynamic matching φ consisting only of µ S is not credibly group-stable. Consider a group deviation (A,φ) from φ where A = M ∪ W , andφ assigns µ M (µ W ) to the first period (the second period). All agents in A are better off inφ than in φ. Thus, to conclude that φ is not credibly groupstable, we show that (A,φ) is defensible. First,φ is sequentially rational, since µ W is credibly group-stable in the period 1 market. Next, consider any sequentially rational pairwise deviation (B,φ) fromφ. Then,φ specifies µ W at t = 1, as (B,φ) is sequentially rational. Thus, the utility values of agents in B fromφ depends only on the period 0 market. Since µ M is stable in the period 0 market, all agents in each pairwise or individual deviation cannot be better off inφ than inφ. Hence, (A,φ) is defensible.
Case 2: A time-dependent dynamic matching φ consisting of µ M in the first period and µ W in the second period is not credibly group-stable. Consider a group deviation (A,φ) from φ where A = M ∪ W , andφ assigns µ W (µ M ) to the first period (the second period). All agents in A are better off inφ than φ. In the same way as Case 1, we can verify that (A,φ) is defensible. Thus, φ is not credibly group-stable.
Pareto Efficiency in Repeated Markets
We turn our attention to Pareto efficiency for repeated markets. Whether an outcome path consisting of stable matchings is Pareto efficient depends on preferences of agents in constituent markets. To examine Pareto efficiency, we introduce a condition, called regularity, for a static market.
Regularity condition for static markets
To introduce the regularity condition, we define a restricted market (M ,W ,ũ), denoted by (M ∪W ), of a static market (M, W, u) to be a static market such thatM ⊂ M ,W ⊂ W ,ũ m is a restriction of u m toW ∪{m} for each m ∈M , andũ w is a restriction of u w toM ∪{w} for each w ∈W . Moreover, throughout this section, a pair (i, j) means that either i belong to the opposite sex of j or i = j. Definition 10. 13 Given a matching µ with the number N of pairs formed in µ, a static market has regularity for µ if there is a sequence of
of pairs for µ (called a regular sequence for µ) such that (a) for k = 1 i 1 's most preferred mate is
In a regular sequence {(i k , µ(i k ))} N k=1 for µ, agent i 1 's partner at µ is µ(i 1 ) who is the best partner to i 1 among all agents. Removing this pair (i 1 , µ(i 1 )) from the market, agent i 2 's partner at µ is µ(i 2 ) who is the best partner to i 2 among all agents except the pair (i 1 , µ(i 1 )). Removing the pairs (i 1 , µ(i 1 )) and (i 2 , µ(i 2 )) from the market, we repeat the same procedure until no agent is left.
Repeated markets
An outcome path µ is Pareto efficient if there is no other outcome path µ such that U i (µ ) ≥ U i (µ) for each i in I with strict inequality for some i in I. Any outcome path consisting of the men-optimal (or women-optimal) stable matching of the constituent market can be supported via credible group stability by Theorem 2. However, in Example 2, such an outcome path is not Pareto efficient, and the constituent market violates the regularity condition.
Theorem 3 (Pareto efficiency). In a repeated market, if the constituent market has regularity for a stable matching µ * , then an outcome path consisting of the stable matching µ * is Pareto efficient.
Proof. Let (M, W, {u i } i∈I ) be a constituent market. Let the outcome path µ * := (µ * , µ * , · · · , µ * ). Take any outcome path µ := (µ t ) T t=0 that is different from µ * . We show that there exists an agent i ∈ I such that U i (µ * ) > U i (µ).
Take a regular sequence {i k , µ * (i k )} N k=1 of pairs for µ * . Take M(i) := {µ ∈ M|(i, µ * (i)) ∈ µ}. We choose a particular agent i K among {i k } N k=1 in the following way:
Step 1: If there exists t = 0, · · · , T such that µ t ∈ M(i 1 ), then set i K = i 1 . Otherwise, go to the next step.
Step k: If there exists t = 0, · · · , T such that µ t ∈ M(i k ), then set i K = i k . Otherwise, go to the next step.
This procedure stops after at most N steps. In addition, we can choose such an agent i K . Otherwise, we would have a contradiction that µ * = µ.
To show that
k=1 are matched with each other, and thus agent i K is not matched with any mate in {i k , µ * (i k )} K−1 k=1 . By regularity and strict preferences, agent i K 's most preferred mate in the restricted market
As an example, consider a repeated market whose constituent market is the period 1 market in Example 4. According to this theorem, an outcome path consisting either only of µ M or only of µ W is Pareto efficient.
It is not clear that the converse of this theorem is true. But the following example suggests a partial converse. 
The numbers in parentheses indicate utilities. Each agent is acceptable to all those of the opposite sex. Note that there is a unique stable matching Thus, the outcome path consisting only of µ * is not Pareto efficient.
Conclusion
Some real-life dynamic matching markets use a mechanism that finds a menoptimal or a women-optimal stable matching. Our result shows that this approach does not create instability in a dynamic setting. Therefore, this approach is justified.
Appendix -Examples and proofs
An example of empty core. Consider a two-period dynamic market with M = {m 1 , m 2 }, W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 }. The preferences are depicted in Figure  9 . In addition, the utility of being unmatched is 0 to each agent. Note that the Figure 9 just indicates the preferences for all agents, but does not show all matchings. There are eleven possible matchings. Denote µ ij by the matching in which m i is matched with w j and the other agents are unmatched. Denote µ ij,kl by the matching in which m i (m k ) is matched with w j (w l ) and the other agent is unmatched. µ U is the matching where all agents are unmatched. In total, we have 121 = 11×11 outcome paths. Out of them, we have 15 individual rational outcome paths: (µ 11 , µ 11 ), (µ 11 , µ 21 ), (µ 13 , µ 11 ), (µ 13 , µ 13 µ 22 ) , (µ 22 , µ 22 ),(µ 11,22 , µ 11, 22 ). The first eleven outcome paths are blocked by the pair (m 2 , w 2 ) via (µ 22 , µ 22 ), and the last four are blocked by (m 1 , w 3 ) via (µ 13 , µ 13 ).
Proof of Proposition 1. Let a dynamic matching φ be group stable. Sup-pose for a contradiction that its outcome path µ(φ) = {µ t (φ)} T t=0 is not in the core. Then, there exist a group A and an outcome pathμ := {μ t } T t=0 such that U A (μ) > U A (µ(φ)). Then, for each t take a matchingμ t such that (A,μ t ) is a static group deviation from µ t (φ) andμ t (i) =μ t (i) for each i in A. Consider the dynamic group deviation (A,φ):
Proof of Proposition 2. Picking a statically stable matching of the constituent market, a dynamic matching assigning the static stable matching to each history can be easily verified to be pairwise stable.
Lemma 3 (b)
. Consider a static market (Knuth, 1976) where Thus, µ is credibly pairwise-stable. We show that µ is not credibly group-stable. Consider the group deviation (A,μ) from µ where A = {m 2 , m 3 , w 1 , w 4 }, (m 2 , w 4 ) ∈μ, and (m 3 , w 1 ) ∈μ. Note that the restrictionμ| A is stable in a restricted market consisting of A. Thus, no agent in A can be better off by being matched with each other. The only possibility that agents in A are better off by deviating fromμ is that either m 2 is matched with w 1 or m 3 is matched with w 4 . However, all of these agents are in A and thus no agent in A can benefit from deviations. Thus, (A,μ) is defensible. In addition, all agents in A are better off inμ than in µ. Thus, µ is not credibly group-stable.
Proof of Lemma 4. Fix a stable matching µ and a defensible group deviation (A,μ) from µ. Let B be the set of all agents outside A who are matched at µ, and C be the set of all agents outside A whose partner is in A. That is, agents in B (C) satisfy the condition (b) (the condition (c)) in Definition 4. Note that all agents in C are unmatched atμ. Then, by both the stability of µ and the defensibility of (A,μ), it is sufficient to show that C is empty.
Suppose for a contradiction that C is not empty. Without loss of generality, take a woman w 0 in C ∩ W . Using the stability of µ and the defensibility of (A,μ), we will recursively construct an infinite sequence {(m k , w k )} ∞ k=1 of distinct pairs in M × W such that for each k = 1, 2, · · · (a) (m k , w k−1 ) ∈ µ, 
or u m 1 (w 0 ) ≡ u m 1 (µ) < u m 1 (w 1 ) ≡ u m 1 (μ).
If the inequality (2) were true, then with the inequality (1), the pair (m 1 , w 0 ) would blockμ, violating the defensibility of (A,μ) as m 1 is in A. Thus, the inequality (3) is true so that (d) is satisfied. Now, µ(w 1 ) = µ(w 1 ) ≡ m 1 , otherwise we would have a contradiction that w 0 = w 1 . Since µ is stable, it follows from the inequality (3) and strict preferences that u w 1 (µ) > u w 1 (μ) so that (e) is satisfied. Now, {m 1 , w 1 , w 0 } satisfies the conditions (a)-(e).
Suppose that we are given w 0 and {(m k , w k )} K−1 k=1 which satisfy the conditions (a)-(e) and all of whom are distinct. We construct m K and w K that satisfy the conditions. First, by our hypothesis,
If w K−1 were unmatched at µ, then w K−1 would blockμ from the inequality (4), violating the defensibility of (A,μ) as w K−1 is in A by our hypothesis. 
If the inequality (5) were true, then with the inequality (4), the pair (m K , w K−1 ) would blockμ, violating the defensibility as m K and w K−1 are in A. Thus, the inequality (6) holds so that (d) is satisfied. Finally, µ(w K ) = m K as m K is matched with w K−1 = w K . This implies from the stability of µ and the inequality (6) that u w K (µ) < u w K (μ) ≡ u w K (m K ) so that (e) is satisfied. Now, we have the desired sequence.
